The trajectory of Anwar Nasser Abdulla al-Awlaki, from a U.S.-educated recipient of federal funding to a prominent leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and a target of a U.S. drone strike, represents a complex and troubling chapter in American counter-terrorism efforts. His story is interwoven with critical moments in modern history, including the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and continues to raise profound questions about intelligence failures, the nature of radicalization, and the long-term implications of foreign policy.
Early Life, Education, and the USAID Controversy
Born in Las Cruces, New Mexico, in 1968, Anwar al-Awlaki held dual U.S. and Yemeni citizenship. His early life in the United States included academic pursuits that would later become a point of scrutiny. In 1990, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provided what was described as "full funding" for Awlaki to study civil engineering at Colorado State University. USAID, an independent agency of the U.S. federal government, is primarily responsible for administering civilian foreign aid and development assistance. Its programs typically aim to promote U.S. foreign policy by advancing broad-scale human progress, often focusing on developing nations.
The allocation of funds to Awlaki, a U.S. citizen, for a scholarship seemingly intended for foreign nationals, immediately raised red flags. According to official documents, his birthplace was listed as Sana’a, Yemen, rather than Las Cruces, New Mexico. Federal security agent Ray Fournier and reporting from The New York Times later indicated that this misrepresentation was an attempt to qualify for scholarship money. This early deception, though seemingly minor at the time, highlighted an initial disregard for official protocols and became one of the first anomalies in Awlaki’s documented history. The implications of a U.S. government agency inadvertently funding the education of a future high-value al-Qaeda operative, even under false pretenses, would resonate deeply in subsequent investigations.
Return to the U.S. and Emergence as a Cleric
Awlaki’s movements between Yemen and the United States would become a recurring theme in his narrative. He returned to the U.S. on October 23, 2000, a mere two weeks after the bombing of the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen. The USS Cole attack, a suicide attack by al-Qaeda against the U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer, killed 17 American sailors and injured 39 others, signaling a significant escalation in al-Qaeda’s campaign against American interests prior to 9/11. While the FBI did not establish any immediate connection between Awlaki and the attack at the time of his return, the proximity of these events later added another layer of intrigue to his activities.
In the months leading up to the September 11, 2001, attacks, Awlaki moved to Virginia and assumed the role of imam at the Dar Al-Hijrah Mosque in Falls Church. This mosque, located near the nation’s capital, was a prominent Islamic center in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area and attracted a diverse congregation. Its prominence, combined with Awlaki’s growing influence as a charismatic English-speaking cleric, would later draw significant attention from law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
The Shadow of 9/11 and Initial Interrogations
Just four days after the devastating 9/11 attacks, on September 15, 2001, Awlaki was questioned by authorities. During this initial interrogation, he claimed to have flown into Washington D.C.’s National Airport at 9 AM on September 11, less than an hour before American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon. This detail, while not immediately implicating him, placed him geographically close to one of the attack sites on the day of the tragedy.
The FBI’s early interactions with Awlaki revealed a pattern of evasiveness. He reportedly refused to show his passport during questioning and, at one point, left the interview to take an "urgent" phone call. When pressed on his views regarding jihad, a concept often interpreted differently within Islamic theology but used by extremist groups to justify violence, Awlaki notably stated, "I would like not to comment on that." These actions, documented in FBI reports, contributed to the growing suspicion surrounding his character and potential affiliations, even as a definitive link to the 9/11 plot remained unconfirmed.
Shifting Allegiances and Growing FBI Scrutiny
Years later, in 2003, Awlaki himself initiated contact with the FBI, expressing astonishment at "some of the talk circulating in the media." This talk included allegations of him serving as a "spiritual advisor" to the 9/11 hijackers. Awlaki conveyed a desire to "clarify any misunderstandings," perhaps indicating an awareness of the intensifying scrutiny or an attempt to deflect suspicion. The FBI’s internal reaction to this outreach was telling, with one agent exclaiming, "Holy crap – isn’t this your guy?" This exchange underscored the agency’s evolving, and perhaps belated, realization of Awlaki’s potential significance.
While a potential meeting in London was discussed, it never materialized, as Awlaki ceased responding to the FBI’s communications. This abrupt withdrawal only deepened the mystery surrounding his motives and true loyalties.
The 9/11 Commission Report and Confirmed Connections
In 2004, the official 9/11 Commission Report was released, providing the most comprehensive public account of the attacks. The report detailed Awlaki’s relationship with two of the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. It stated that these two individuals had "developed a close relationship" with Awlaki, attending his mosque in San Diego before he moved to Virginia. This official confirmation of his association with known terrorists cemented Awlaki’s place as a figure of interest in the larger narrative of the attacks. The report also highlighted the intelligence failures that allowed these connections to go unaddressed before the attacks.
Further revelations regarding Awlaki’s connections to the 9/11 plot continued to emerge years later, often through declassified documents and civil lawsuits. A witness during a civil lawsuit filed by 9/11 victims’ families against the Saudi Arabian government stated in 2015 that they had seen Hazmi and Mihdhar at a guest room in Awlaki’s San Diego mosque. The witness also alleged that Awlaki had "closed-door meetings in San Diego with al-Mihdhar, al-Hazmi, and another individual, whom al-Bayoumi had asked to help the hijackers." These details suggested a deeper, more direct involvement than previously understood, placing Awlaki within a network of support for the hijackers during their time in the U.S.
An April 4, 2016, FBI "Encore" Investigation Update, Review and Analysis further discussed Awlaki’s phone contact with Ziyad Khaleel, an alleged equipment procurer for Osama Bin Laden. This connection was, in fact, what initially prompted the FBI to open an investigation into Awlaki in 1999, highlighting that intelligence agencies had been aware of potential problematic associations years before 9/11.
Radicalization and Operational Role in AQAP
Awlaki’s transformation from a mosque imam to a leading propagandist and operational commander for al-Qaeda became increasingly evident in the late 2000s. On July 16, 2010, the U.S. Treasury Department officially designated Awlaki as a key leader for Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), describing him as increasingly dangerous with an "operational role" in the group. AQAP, formed in 2009 from the merger of the Yemeni and Saudi branches of al-Qaeda, quickly established itself as one of the most active and dangerous affiliates of the global terrorist network, known for its sophisticated propaganda and attempts to attack Western targets.
Awlaki’s command of English and his persuasive online sermons made him a unique and potent figure in the extremist landscape. He became a significant voice for radicalization, particularly among English-speaking individuals in Western countries. His sermons and writings, distributed widely online, called for jihad against the West and provided ideological justification for terrorist acts.
His operational involvement was linked to several high-profile terrorist plots:
- Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the "underpants bomber"): In December 2009, Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate an explosive device hidden in his underwear on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 as it approached Detroit. Awlaki was revealed to have provided assistance and guidance to Abdulmutallab, including meeting him in Yemen.
- Nidal Hasan (Fort Hood shooting): In November 2009, Major Nidal Hasan, a U.S. Army psychiatrist, killed thirteen people and injured more than 30 others at Fort Hood, Texas. Investigations revealed that Hasan had exchanged messages with Awlaki prior to the attack, receiving religious justification and encouragement for his actions.
- Faisal Shahzad (Times Square car bomb attempt): In May 2010, Shahzad attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times Square, New York City. He later confessed to being a "fan and follower" of Awlaki, having been inspired by his teachings and trained by AQAP in Pakistan.
These incidents demonstrated Awlaki’s transition from a spiritual guide to an active participant in planning and facilitating acts of terrorism, solidifying his status as a legitimate threat to U.S. national security.
Targeted Killing and Ethical Questions
The U.S. government’s assessment of Awlaki as an imminent threat led to his targeting. On September 30, 2011, Awlaki was killed in Yemen by a U.S. drone strike. President Obama announced his death, hailing it as a significant blow to al-Qaeda. However, Awlaki’s killing, as a U.S. citizen, by a drone strike in a country with which the United States was not formally at war, immediately ignited a fierce debate regarding the legal and ethical boundaries of targeted killings, due process, and executive power. Critics, including civil liberties advocates, argued that the government had unilaterally deprived an American citizen of his life without trial or legal process, setting a dangerous precedent.
The controversy deepened weeks later when Awlaki’s 16-year-old son, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, also a U.S. citizen, was killed in a separate drone strike in Yemen in October 2011. The U.S. government stated that he was not the target, but his death further amplified the legal and ethical questions surrounding the drone program and the targeting of non-combatants, particularly American citizens abroad. Years later, in 2017, Awlaki’s 8-year-old daughter, Nawar al-Awlaki, was also killed in a U.S. raid in Yemen, adding another tragic layer to the family’s story and fueling further debate about the collateral damage of counter-terrorism operations.
Unanswered Questions and the Saudi Connection
The saga of Anwar al-Awlaki continues to be a focal point for understanding the complexities of 9/11 and subsequent intelligence efforts. One of the most persistent and sensitive areas of inquiry revolves around the alleged connections between the 9/11 hijackers, Awlaki, and elements within the Saudi Arabian government.
Declassified documents and ongoing investigations have gradually brought more details to light. A part of Operation Encore, released in 2021 by the Joe Biden administration, revealed that Saudi diplomat Fahad al-Thumairy had directed an associate to look after "two very significant people," later identified as Hazmi and Mihdhar. These revelations bolstered claims made by 9/11 victims’ families who have long sought to hold the Saudi government accountable for alleged complicity.
Further evidence has focused on Omar al-Bayoumi, who supported both Hazmi and Mihdhar during their time in San Diego. Later reveals showed Bayoumi worked as an agent of Saudi intelligence. Critically, Awlaki was later revealed to have had phone calls with Bayoumi just days after Bayoumi was setting up bank accounts for the hijackers in San Diego. Videos released in 2022 reportedly show Awlaki warmly greeting Bayoumi before the events of September 11. These connections suggest a potential nexus where official Saudi resources might have inadvertently, or even wittingly, facilitated the hijackers’ movements and preparations, with Awlaki serving as a key node in this network.
Broader Implications and Enduring Legacy
The story of Anwar al-Awlaki stands as a stark reminder of the challenges inherent in intelligence gathering and counter-terrorism. His progression from a U.S.-funded student to a radicalized ideologue and operational leader highlights the complexities of monitoring individuals and anticipating threats. The years of warnings, connections, and unanswered questions surrounding his early associations, particularly with the 9/11 hijackers, underscore significant intelligence failures that continue to be scrutinized.
The ethical and legal questions raised by the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen, and the subsequent deaths of his children, have had a profound impact on debates surrounding U.S. counter-terrorism policy, drone warfare, and the balance between national security and civil liberties. The ongoing pursuit of transparency regarding Saudi involvement in 9/11, fueled by new disclosures and civil litigation, ensures that the legacy of Awlaki and the events he was linked to will continue to be examined.
As the nation approaches the 25th anniversary of 9/11, the story of Anwar al-Awlaki serves as a critical case study. It compels a continued examination of why so many warning signs were missed, why certain answers remain hidden, and how intelligence agencies adapt to evolving threats from individuals who navigate complex geopolitical landscapes and exploit modern communication technologies to propagate extremist ideologies. The pursuit of these answers remains crucial for understanding the past and safeguarding against future threats.
